Deontic Paradoxes and Moral Theory

I published this paper some years ago. But it sounds yet. In fact, the topic remains hard to override. So I thoutgh to re - publish partially that article in this section:

(previous version on: http://mondodomani.org/dialegesthai/ap16.htm)

"The paradoxes invalidate host theoretical system's rationality. Since its origins, deontic logic was an attempt to formalize moral reasoning, moral theory's language. Now, if it seems irrational, or incoherent in many achievements, is moral theory irrational too? As Cremaschi states:

la logica deontica è rilevante per il ragionamento pratico.33

While Artosi deems that:

Filosofi morali e giuristi sembrano essere i clienti naturali del logico deontico. E, tuttavia, non sembra che si siano stabiliti buoni rapporti né con gli uni, né con gli altri. Colpa del venditore, probabilmente, che non sa presentare bene la merce. In realtà, molte cose possono aver contribuito a creare e a diffondere l'impressione che la logica deontica è irrilevante per l'etica e per il diritto.34

Then, if deontic logic is incoherent, so inconsistent, then entire moral theory is irrational. This is a result unpalatable. In fact, it implies to expel practical reason from rational domain. Instead, Poli states:

il pensiero pratico è pensiero sul mondo in relazione a specifici concetti essenzialmente pratici. Pensiamo praticamente quando emettiamo ordini e comandi e quando prendiamo decisioni.35

Then, we must consider practical reasoning as thinking's portion. In fact, von Wright writes:

il pensiero pratico è pur sempre pensiero e, come tale, deve soddisfare i requisiti e le leggi della logica.36

Then, how can we face deontic paradoxes? For many authors, deontic paradoxes are made by a particular tensionbetween common knowledge of norms and specific formal job. Makinson states:

There is a singular tension between the philosophy of norms and the formal work of deontic logicians.37

One tension between common normative intuitions and the formalism of deontic logic.38

So, we must to add following remarks on the matter:

(a) SDL is a logic that formalize the behavior of deontic conceptions (as well as their normative propositions), while settling what is content of normative proposition is ethics'task;39

(b) SDL is possible but it hasn't functions exorbitant from its formal structure.

Still, nothing prevent us to believing that in future logic's development can to extend deontic logic's functions and its suitable for ethical propositions. In fact, Grana writes:

la logica nella sua evoluzione, come abbiamo già accennato precedentemente, ha esteso il suo campo d'indagine dalle proposizioni conoscitive ed assertive, vere o false, a proposizioni normative, allorché è riuscita a catturare in modo rigoroso quel dominio dell'instabile, del vago, del lacunoso, che era appunto escluso dai parametri angusti della logica standard. Questo nuovo dominio è stato esteso alle norme, settore in cui più che in ogni altro era necessaria una buona razionalizzazione [...] oggi sappiamo che questo dominio è più vasto ed investe settori come l'etica, il diritto e più in generale la filosofia.40

In last years, many model of a new deontic logic are proposed, defeasible deontic logic41 and a paraconsistent deontic logic.42 These proposal are based on modifications of SDL's axioms. So, it seems to us to face principal problems: (1) relations of cause between deontic moods; (2) relations of conditional (primary and secondary) between deontic propositions; (3) deontic moods iterated; (4) iterated moods; (5) defeasibility and introduction oftimes and agency in deontic propositions; (6) coherence's bonds. Feldman states:

it seems to me that the solutions to the paradoxes require a system that has at least the following features: (a) it must be able to express some sort of conditional obligations for which factual detachment fails; (b) it must be able to express the idea that something may be obligatory as of one time, but not-obligatory at some other time; (c) it must be able to express the idea that something may be obligatory for one person, but not for others. Insofar as other systems lacks these features, I cannot see how they can provide adequate solutions to the paradoxes.43

The future will say to us if it is possible this advanced deontic logic."

At last, are there any solutions?